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On appeal, the court first noted, to acquire title by adverse possession, a claimant must show actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious,
and adverse possession under a claim of ownership for a period of ten
years. Moreover, each element must be both continuous and uninterrupted for the entire ten-year period. The court determined the
Boltes' use was not continuous, because the land was suitable for yearround use, and the Boltes only used it intermittently. Next, the court
rejected the Boltes' claim that the use of the fence as a boundary line
sufficiently established adverse possession. The court reasoned the
fence was insufficient because this use lacked a claim of ownership of a
nature sufficient to put the real property owner on notice. In conclusion, the court held the Boltes did not establish continuous use, exclusive use, or the claim of ownership necessary for an adverse possession
claim and, accordingly, the court reversed the trial court ruling and
remanded the case.
JonathanLong
Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005) (adopting
the Restatement (Second) of Torts rules for disputes between users of
hydrologically connected ground and surface water; holding that although Spear T did not precisely state a claim under the Restatement,
Nebraska's pleading rules require the district court to allow amended
claims, and determining that the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act does not abrogate any common-law claims).
Spear T Ranch, Inc. ("Spear T") alleged in the District Court for
Morrill County, Nebraska, that Knaub's irrigation wells drained water
from Pumpkin Creek, depriving Spear T of its surface water appropriation. Knaub moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
the court could grant relief.
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, Spear T argued it
stated a claim for conversion, trespass, or injunction. Knaub made two
arguments in the alternative. First, the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act ("GWMPA") abrogated any common-law
claims, and second, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the North
Platte Natural Resources District ("NRD") possessed jurisdiction to
determine the issues.
The court considered Spear T's prior appropriation claim and rejected it for three reasons. First, Nebraska law maintains a legal fiction
to the effect that the over-pumping of groundwater cannot harm a user
of surface water. Second, neither Nebraska's statutes, nor extant case
law, developed a system or doctrine to address conflicts between users
of surface and groundwater. Finally, if the court adopted Spear T's
rule, first-in-time surface water appropriators would have a superior
right to all later groundwater users. The court stated that this could
shut down all the wells in areas where ground and surface water are
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hydrologically connected. Therefore, the court declined to apply Nebraska's statutory surface-water appropriation rules to conflicts between users of ground and surface water. The court also rejected Spear
T's conversion claim because surface water rights are usufructory, not
property, rights and thus could not support a claim of conversion or
trespass.
The court next considered whether Spear T stated a claim under
other common-law doctrines. The court discussed various groundwater rules and concluded that the best rule was set forth by the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"). The Restatement permitted
a user of groundwater to pump water for beneficial purposes unless: it
caused harm by unreasonably lowering either the water table or artesian pressure; it exceeded the user's reasonable share of the annual
supply or total store; or it had a direct and substantial effect on a watercourse or lake and unreasonably harmed a user entitled to use of
those waters. The Restatement determined reasonableness on a caseby-case basis and kept the test flexible by permitting consideration of
many factors during the determination. Because the Restatement acknowledged and attempted to balance the competing equities of users,
and because it permitted the fact finder flexibility in determining reasonableness, the court adopted the Restatement rule to govern conflicts involving hydrologically connected surface and groundwater users. Thus, the court held that a groundwater user is not subject to liability for interference unless the ground water use directly and substantially affects a watercourse or lake causing unreasonable harm to a
person entitled to use of the surface water.
The court concluded that under this rule, Spear T alleged that
Knaub's use of groundwater directly and substantially affected Pumpkin Creek. However, Spear T had not alleged that Knaub's actions
harmed Spear T, thus, Spear T failed to state a claim upon which the
court could grant relief. However, the court concluded that Nebraska's pleading rules permit a plaintiff to amend its complaint and
thus, the district court erred in dismissing Spear T's claim rather than
permitting Spear T to amend the claim.
The court also found that the GWMPA neither expressly abrogates
a common-law claim nor demonstrates any intent in its legislative history to abrogate a claim by a surface user against a groundwater user.
Moreover, the court found that the GWMPA is ambiguous regarding
procedure when a party requests that the NRD take action, nor does
the GWMPA authorize the NRD to remedy a past harm. Thus, the
GWMPA does not abrogate any common-law claim. Finally, the court
examined joinder, and held that Spear T did not need to join all the
well users in the Pumpkin Creek basin because a joint tort-feasor is
liable for his or her conduct that causes harm. The fact that the harm
would not occur without another party's concurrent actions provides
no defense. Thus, the district court erred in finding Spear T failed to
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join all necessary parties. The court reversed and remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.
Jeff Gillio
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Sandford v. Town of Woffeboro, 868 A.2d 1002 (N.H. 2005) (holding
the character and nature of the use that created the prescriptive easement defined the scope of that prescriptive easement, and a town had
limited flexibility in exercising its prescriptive easement where the water levels the town maintained affected private property owners).
Joseph W. Sandford,Jr. ("Sandford") appealed a decision from the
Carroll Superior Court of New Hampshire that determined the scope
of the Town of Wolfeboro's ("town") easement included the right to
flow Sandford's land as a secondary result from adjusting to the needs,
desires, and circumstances of the town's water situation by controlling
its dam. The superior court concluded it could not use the scope of an
easement to determine prescriptive flow rights because the nature of
the two rights was extremely different; instead, the court found only
historically and customary use of the dam could determine the scope
of an easement. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
considered whether the superior court's assessment of the scope of the
easement was proper.
Sandford owned land on the shore of Lake Wentworth in Wolfeboro. A dam controlled the lake's water level and maintained a water
of level of approximately 534.7 feet above sea level, which it had been
since the 1920s. In 1958 Smith River Corporation deeded the dam to
the town, and the deed required the town maintain certain minimum
water levels in the lake, which varied by season. The deed did not specify a maximum water level for the lake. Through its predecessors in
title, the town also had a prescriptive easement to flow water up to the
top of the dam. As a result, for parts of each year, the town would flow
Sandford's land to the same level: approximately 534.7 feet above sea
level.
Sandford argued the trial court improperly defined the scope of
the town's easement based on intent, rather than actual use. He contended pre-1958 water reports and other documentation established
the town did not historically flow the dam, and thus his land, to the full
height, but that in most years, the town maintained lower water levels.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated the character and nature
of the use that created the prescriptive easement was what defined the
scope of that prescriptive easement. The court then noted it had previously addressed a similar case where the court held one acquires a
right to an easement by uninterrupted use of the right at all times in
accordance to the pleasure or convenience of the party claiming the
right. Accordingly, the court reiterated the right to a water level "as

